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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,. 
-vs-
Case No. 
15705 
DENON JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by information with having 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii), 1953, by dis-
tributing for value a controlled substance, heroin. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable 
Calvin Gould presiding. The appellant was found guilty of the 
offense charged in the information, and was sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed fifteen (15) years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmation of the lower 
court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 17, 1977, the appellant was the object 
of a "controlled buy" conducted by the narcotics division a' 
the Ogden Police Department. Annette Stubbs, a known prost 
1 
and addict who had agreed to work with the police, was util: 
as an undercover agent and was the principal witness for th, 
state. 
Appellant's name was selected that evening by the 
police officers involved from a list of dealers provided ~Q 
by Miss Stubbs (T.13). Miss Stubbs was strip-searched byt 
female police officers and found to have no drugs or drug 
apparata on her person (T.57). She was then instructed to 
telephone the appellant and "set up the buy." (T .14) . Miss 
Stubbs then called the appellant on the telephone and toNl 
she would "be down in about 15 minutes" and hung up. Nothir 
was said concerning a purchase of drugs over the phone (T.8: 
Miss Stubbs noted that appellant had requested that she n~ 
make such references over the phone (T.84). Officer Pitc~ 
then gave Miss Stubbs two empty syringes and $60. 00 (T .14). 
As police officers watched fron four separate sur· 
veillance posts, Miss Stubbs was let off near appellant•sU 
(T. 16) they saw her walk to the home and go in (T. 17) 15 mi:I 
later, she was watched as she came out and walked several 
blocks and down an alley to a waiting police car (T.18). 
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Miss Stubbs gave Officer Pitcock back the two 
syringes. One syringe was empty, the other was half full of 
a reddish substance (T.20). Officer Pitcock was able to 
positively identify the syringes as those which had been given 
to Miss Stubbs earlier by observing small marks which he had 
made upon them without her knowledge (T.21,25). The reddish 
substance was positively identified by a police chemist, James 
Gaskill, as heroin and a small amount of blood (T.160,161). 
Miss Stubbs was again strip-searched by the two female officers 
and found, again, to have no contraband or money with her 
(T.59). Appellant was not arrested immediately, but, rather, 
a number of days later in order to protect Miss Stubbs' cover 
(T. 3 2 I 3 3) • 
Annette Stubbs testified that appellant had sold her 
two balloons of heroin for $60.00 (T.85). She said that he 
watched that night as she prepared the syringe and began to 
inject herself, but then left the room briefly (T.86). When 
he left, she switched the half full syringe for the empty one 
and acted as if she were cleaning it out (T.86). She then left 
and returned both syringes to Officer Pitcock. 
At one point, the prosecuting attorney asked Miss 
Stubbs if she had ever carried out an act of prostitution in 
appellant's house (T.79). Over defense counsel's objection, 
she stated that in the past she had often taken "tricks" to 
his home and paid him $5.00 for the use of a bedroom, after 
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which she would purchase heroin from him with the proceeds 
(T.80). Elsewhere, she described her relationship with t~ 
appellant as friendly and stated that she had often bought 
heroin from him (T.78). 
Although the appellant denied having ever sold 
drugs to anybody (T.206), the jury found him guilty as char: 
of distributing a controlled substance for value. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF ANNETTE STUBBS' RELATIONSHIP WITH THI 
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO OCTOBER 17, 1977, WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
AS IT DEMONSTRATED INTENT, PREPARATION, PLAN AND SCHEME OF 
OPERATIONS. 
Although evidence of crimes committed by the deft.I 
other than those covered in the immediate prosecution is 
generally inadmissible, Utah rules and precedent allow cer~ 
exceptions to the rule. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides: 
"Subject to Rule 47 evidence that 
a person committed a crime or civil 
wrong on a specified occasion, is in-
admissible to prove his disposition 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the 
basis for an inference that he com-
mitted another crime or civil wrong 
on another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove 
-4-
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some other material fact including absence 
?f wistake or accident, mot~ve, opportunity, 
:i:_1_1tent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity.'' (Emphasis added). 
See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232, (Utah 1975). 
This general principle of evidence was explained by 
the court in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969): 
"Concededly, evidence of other crimes 
is not admissible if the purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil 
character with a propensity to commit crime 
and thus likely to have committed the crime 
charged. However, if the evidence has 
relevancy to explain the circumstances sur-
rounding the instant crime, it is admissible 
for that purpose; and the fact that it may 
tend to connect the defendant with another 
crime will not render it incornpetant." (Id. 
at 775.) --
Appellant contends that evidence concerning Miss 
Stubbs' prior use of his home for Prostitution and connected 
purchases of heroin was presented solely to disgrace the appellant 
or to demonstrate his evil character and should, therefore, have 
been excluded. Had this been the motivation and purpose for 
the presentation of the evidence, it should have been excluded. 
However the appellant is incorrect in asserting that purpose as 
the motivation behind the introduction of the evidence. When 
questioned as tb the purpose of presenting the evidence, Mr. 
Gladwell, the prosecuting attorney responded, 
"The purpose, even though this type of 
evidence may have a tendency to inf lame the 
jury, the purpose for admitting this kind 
of evidence is number one, to prove identity, 
to prove she knows who Denon Jones is, and 
she knows Denon Jones will sell her heroin. 
-5-
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Another purpose is to show knowledge and 
intent. Why did he invite her to come 
down that evening on the basis of a simole 
phone call? What was the intent. His -
intent on accepting her in the house that 
evening. Why had she gone in there. And 
you know, dozens of other occasions prior 
to that. Hhat was the intent of him 
receiving her into the home. Preparation, 
plan, motive, a scheme of operation. All 
of these things, your Honor~ we intend to 
prove by presenting evidence regarding the 
relationship between the defendant and 
Annette Stubbs." (T. 66) . 
Mr. Gladwell also noted that the prosecution had no inte~k 
of putting the appellant's character in issue (T.67). 
Although the circumstantial evidence surrounding 
the "controlled buy" was carefully prepared and demonstrated 
with virtual certainty that Miss Stubbs obtained heroin wtt~ 
appellant's home, certain important questions were left un-
answered without the additional testimony regarding Miss ~~ 
prior relationship with appellant. How could Miss Stubbs~ 
to buy heroin by calling on the phone late at night and simr; 
I 
asking if she could come over, without any mention of a fu~1 
I 
purchase? How did she know that she could get heroin froo~ 
appellant? How did she know to take syringes with her--tha:; 
I 
she would not be allowed to carry the drug out of the housei 
How did she know how much money she would need? 
Through the presentation of Miss Stubbs' test~m 
concerning prior dealings with the appellant, the state wm, 
to demonstrate why she knew heroin was available for $30.0!'! 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quarter-teaspoon in the appellant's house (T.78). The state 
was ablA to show that an on-going business relationship 
involving use of and entry into appellant's home and the 
purchase of heroin existed between appellant and Annette 
Stubbs (T. 79,80). 
In State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d 636 
(1972), this Court pointed out that "ordinarily the admissib-
ility of evidence is for the trial court, and in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion on the part of the court, the ruling 
will not be disturbed on appeal." (Id. at 637) This Court has 
further noted, in State v. Lo~~· supra, that "such harm as 
there may be in receiving evidence concerning another crime is 
to be weighed against the necessity of full inquiry into the 
facts relating to the issues." (Id. at 775). 
In the present case the trial judge exercised sound 
discretion in admitting the above-noted evidence. He was given 
ample opportunity to consider its portent before it was admitted 
and he allowed it in. Clearly, in his view, the importance of 
th~ evidence in explaining the situation and putting the entire 
matter before the jury out-weighed any prejudicial effect it 
may have had upon the jury. In the absence of any clear show-
ing of an abuse of discretion, the trial judge's ruling on this 
matter should stand. 
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In view of the strength of evidence presented by t~. 
prosecution concerning the "buy" which demonstrated that Miss 
Stubbs entered appellant's home with $ 60. 00 and no heroin and 
1 
came out without the money but with a quantity of heroin plus 
Miss Stubbs' testimony that she had, on that night, purchased 
i 
heroin from the appellant, the state contends that appellant f 
I 
was not substantially prejudiced by the admission of evidence\ 
r 
explaining the circumstances preceding the actual crime being 1 
prosecuted. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence claimed by appellant to be erroneous~ 
admitted was not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating the 
accused's evil nature or character, but, rather, was for the 
permissible purpose of explaining the circumstances surround-i 
::: :::.::i:: ::.:::::n~o :::::s:::t:.~::::::.p:::::::i::~ pll 
the introduction of the evidence and the fact that the evi~~ 
tends to show that the appellant had committed other crimes 
does not render the evidence incompetant. 
For these reasons the state urges the court to uphol 
the verdict and judgment of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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